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1 
Abstract— Automated production systems (aPS) are complex 
systems with high reliability standards which can – besides 
through traditional testing – be ensured by verification using 
formal methods. In this paper we present a development 
process for aPS software supported by efficient formal 
techniques with easy-to-use specification formalisms to increase 
applicability in the aPS engineering domain. Our approach is 
tailored to the development of evolving aPS as existing behavior 
of earlier revisions is reused as specification for the verification. 
The approach covers three verification phases: regression 
verification, verification of critical interlock invariants and 
delta specification and verification. The approach is designed to 
be comprehensible by aPS software engineers: Two practically 
applicable specification means are presented.  
Formal methods have not yet been widely adapted in 
industrial aPS development since they lack (a) scalability, and 
(b) concise and comprehensible specification means. This paper 
shows concepts how to tackle both issues by referring to 
existing behavior during evolution verification to advance 
towards the goal of applicability in the aPS engineering 
domain. 
A laboratory case study demonstrates the feasibility and 
performance of the approach and shows promising results. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Automated production systems (aPS) [1], such as 
industrial manufacturing plants, are commonly automated 
with Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), which are 
computing devices specially tailored to control automated 
production systems in dependable or safety-critical real time 
environments. As malfunctions may cause severe damage to 
the system itself, the processed payload and interacting 
persons, high quality requirements are imposed on an aPS 
and on its software in particular. These requirements are 
commonly ensured by software testing. While testing is a 
common fault detection method, it often fails to detect rare 
problematic events. A single test case describes only one 
specific behavioral pattern, therefore testing can usually not 
cover the complete system behavior and cannot prove 
correctness. Complementary to testing, formal methods can 
be used to mathematically and exhaustively prove the 
compliance of a system to a specification, including all 
possible corner cases and rare events. 
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In factory automation engineering, quality assurance by 
formal methods is not common yet. There are two main 
reasons for that: (a) today’s formal verification tools fail at 
verifying industrial sized problems (state space explosion) 
and (b) the specifications required for formal verification are 
extensive and not intuitive for the engineer. Applying a 
formal method and interpreting its results require a deep 
understanding of the underlying concepts and are unduly 
labor-intensive. 
Evolution verification addresses both issues by reusing 
old software revisions as specification for the desired 
behavior of the new revision. In its purest form, evolution 
verification would require the new system to behave 
identically to an old revision. Evidently, this requirement is 
too strict for most use cases. We therefore enrich this form of 
verification (called regression verification [2]) by means to 
formulate which parts of the behavior remain the same, 
which parts have changed and how they have changed. Thus, 
evolution verification aims at formally proving that software 
remains correct throughout its evolution, changes have the 
desired effect, and no new bugs are introduced. The benefit is 
twofold: It avoids the need to write full functional 
specifications for the system, which is the main bottleneck 
for routine practical use of formal verification. It is plausible 
to assume that the specification of the change in behavior is 
far more feasible than the full specification – both regarding 
complexity and size. Moreover, the subsequent verification 
effort mainly depends on the difference between the 
programs and not on their overall size and complexity.  
The main contribution of this paper is an approach for a 
verification-supported development process for the evolution 
of aPS software, integrating three different verification 
phases that address different aspects of software correctness 
in the face of evolution. The goal is to enhance formal 
verification towards industrial applicability by reducing the 
overall verification complexity, minimizing required 
specification effort and supporting the application engineer in 
their task: Regression verification for supposedly unchanged 
behavior is complemented with verification of critical 
invariants (rules never to be broken) and delta verification of 
specific changed parts of the behavior. Furthermore, two 
appropriate notations are presented which allow an intuitive 
specification of intended new behavior. Formal verification 
techniques are outlined which allow to verify the arising 
verification obligations efficiently. In a case study, the 
approach is evaluated for feasibility and performance using a 
laboratory aPS example. 
The paper is structured as follows: An overview over 
related work in the adjacent fields to the developed approach 
is given in Section II. The concept of our approach is 
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presented in Section III, which is applied and discussed in a 
case study in Section IV. In the last section, a conclusion and 
an outlook are given. 
II. RELATED WORK IN (MODEL-BASED) TESTING, VIRTUAL 
COMMISSIONING AND FORMAL VERIFICATION 
The aim of software quality assurance methods is to 
support the developer in identifying software faults and to fix 
them efficiently. (Model-based) Testing, virtual 
commissioning, and formal verification are the prevalent 
research directions in the field of factory automation. 
Many advances are made in the area of model-based 
testing [3]. Here, tests can be generated from formal models 
based on UML specifications [4]–[6], which can be extended 
by using virtual commissioning techniques [7], [8] to include 
behavior regarding the controlled hardware and technical 
process in the factory automation system. Recent approaches 
based on regression testing [9] aim at increasing the 
efficiency of these approaches during evolution by 
supporting the selection of appropriate test cases. Testing 
allows to validate the system behavior in a restricted time 
frame, but possesses weaknesses regarding the detection of 
rare events, as test cases relate to very specific scenarios of a 
specification rather than proving correct behavior. However, 
these rare events are potentially very critical. To counter this, 
some approaches generate input sequences for test cases 
directly from the code [10], [11] relying on coverage criteria. 
Yet, these approaches lack conformance criteria (the test 
oracle) and are constrained to simple programs, such as 
single program organization units (POUs). 
Complementary to testing and virtual commissioning 
approaches, formal verification techniques can be applied to 
close this gap. Instead of analyzing a specific application 
scenario, formal techniques aim at analyzing state space 
models exhaustively, i.e., covering all reachable states [12], 
[13]. Automatic verification can also be beneficial compared 
to simulation and testing, because it can – besides exploring 
all reachable states – be applied earlier in the design phase 
[14]. Several works focus on verifying PLC code using 
model checkers [15]–[18]. Efficient translation methods from 
Sequential Function Charts (or similar) to precisely 
formalized (timed) automata are given by [16], [19], [20]. 
Yet, the state explosion problem is a struggle or even a 
reason to fail for these approaches when applied to industrial 
PLC software due to its complexity. In addition, most 
approaches rely on precise functional specifications or 
environment models, which oftentimes do not exist in the 
domain of automation engineering. 
Regression verification focuses on analyzing whether 
regressions, e.g., software bugs or undesired behavior, are 
introduced by changes to a system. It was first introduced by 
[21], where the equivalence of C programs using a software 
model checker is proved. Many approaches have been 
developed for the verification of program equivalence in the 
area of computer science since. In [22], automatic inference 
of coupling predicates is used to prove the equivalence of C 
programs. In recent work, these ideas are extended for use in 
PLC software [23]. In many cases, the sole relation between 
old and new behavior is not easily described to cover 
evolution steps sufficiently, as verification of changed 
behavior and its influence is not regarded. Extending prior 
work, we widen our scope and embed regression verification 
into a holistic approach, covering the full evolution process. 
Formal specifications defining supposedly correct 
behavior can also contain faults, just as the corresponding 
software. Thus, a finding by [24] is of high importance. Here, 
an experimental study of PLC programming analyzed 
different kinds of faults when writing code using different 
types of UML/SysML languages or IEC 61131-3 Function 
Block Diagrams (FBD). In a lab-based study with students, 
technicians and trainees, a detailed observation of error 
causes was conducted. Results indicate that an insufficient 
understanding of the notation’s syntax was the cause for most 
of the faults in the code. Therefore, using unfamiliar and 
complex notations within the industry does not seem 
advisable, neither for specifying behavior nor for 
programming. However, most related verification approaches 
rely on manually formalized mathematical artefacts or 
unfamiliar notations, e.g., petri nets [25]. For generating test 
cases, notations such as timing diagrams [26] were 
successfully used and evaluated in industrial scenarios with 
experts in this domain. In [27], control code for avoiding 
critical conditions (interlock code) is generated from CAEX 
documents. In addition, a cause & effect matrix is generated 
for documentation and further analyses of criticality. To gain 
acceptance in industry, notations must be easily learnable and 
close to notations already in use. 
III. CONCEPT – THREE-PHASE FORMAL VERIFICATION OF 
SOFTWARE EVOLUTION 
As an aPS evolves, its software must often be adapted to 
changed requirements or processes [28]. It is not unlikely that 
software modifications and extensions have an unintended 
impact on the system behavior, i.e., they deviate from the 
given requirements specification. A modification may break 
existing good behavior or introduce undesired new behavior 
into the system. Figure 1 outlines the verification concept 
schematically. The original behavior of the initial software 
revision is denoted “old”. The software modification induces 
a change in behavior (marked Δ) which overlays the original 
behavior, modifying parts of it and leaving other parts 
uninfluenced. 
  
Figure 1.  The three verification phases of our approach: (1) Verify old 
behavior using regression verification, (2) verify critical invariants by 
reusing existing specifications and (3) verify new behavior (delta). 
Our approach proposes three analysis phases building on 
top of each other to verify different aspects of the correctness 
of aPS software evolution: First regression verification is 
employed to show that defined parts of the old behavior are 
inherited by the new software. Then, general critical interlock 
invariants are checked for the newly introduced behavior. 
  
Finally, the new behavior is verified against a formal delta 
specification. 
The three phases target at different aspects of the 
observable software behavior, evoked by a sequence of 
sensor values and characterized by a sequence of actuator 
readings as output by the software over time (i.e., PLC scan 
cycles). First, regression verification [2] is performed, which 
analyses whether the new revision behaves equivalently to 
the old version for all cases where no change in behavior is 
intended. Secondly, the cases in which the behavior is 
supposed to change are checked against existing critical 
interlocking properties (avoiding situations possibly leading 
to collisions or damages). Thirdly, the behavior which has 
not been present in the old revision – the same that is checked 
for critical properties in the second phase – is verified against 
lightweight delta specifications (written for that occasion), 
which outline the behavior of the newly introduced code. 
The regression verification in the first step covers 
unchanged behavior, which in this case is regarded as 
intended behavior; interlock and approved behavior 
guarantees are thus directly inherited from the old revision. 
Formal verification in the latter two phases can thus be 
limited to the new behavior not covered by regression 
verification, i.e., those parts of the software which are 
influenced by the change. This reduces the verification 
complexity drastically and allows efficient verification. 
In all three verification phases violations of the 
implementation against the desired behavior are presented to 
the user by counter examples in the form of input traces in 
textual form. 
A. Phase 1: Detecting Undesired Regression in Previously 
Existing Intended Behavior using Regression Verification 
Regression verification in its purest form verifies perfect 
behavioral equivalence between two PLC software revisions. 
That means, for all sequences of sensor readings the 
produced sequence of actuator outputs is identical. Yet, in 
practice, regression verification rarely means asserting 
perfect equivalence between software revisions. Usually, the 
intention is that specific parts of the behavior are related in 
some way, e.g., behave identically. For formal verification, 
the cases in which equivalence is expected need to be 
described precisely. This description only specifies the input 
sequences to be considered, while the intended behavior is 
defined by the old revision, resulting in a very low 
specification effort. For that reason, it seems reasonable to 
conduct regression verification for a part of the behavior (the 
old behavior) as the first step in the verification of an 
evolution event to ensure that the newly introduced behavior 
does not affect this intended behavior. 
The only specification that is required for so called 
conditional regression verification is a characterization of 
considered behavior as a condition on the sequence of sensor 
values. One possibility for such specification is structured 
natural text constraining the possible input sequences. Simple 
phrases like “Sensor 1 is always true”, “Sensor 2 is true while 
Sensor 3 is false” or more complex descriptions like 
“Whenever Sensor 4 is true, Sensor 4 remains true until 
Sensor 5 is true” can be interpreted formally. The meaning of 
such phrases is a formula in linear temporal logic (LTL). For 
instance, “Sensor1 is always true” becomes G Sensor1 when 
interpreted as temporal logic formula. 
The verification is conducted using a symbolic model 
checker which is fed with translations of the two software 
revisions. The proof obligation to check is that the condition 
on the input values implies equivalence on the actuator 
output values in each PLC scan cycle. Both software 
revisions are modelled as parallel input for the model 
checker. To cover all possible behavior, every input signal is 
modelled as a non-deterministic choice. 
B. Phase 2: Ensuring Global Interlock Invariants 
Most aPSs possess fundamental interlock rules which 
must be maintained at all costs during evolution. Examples 
for such properties are critical sensor / actuator combinations 
that must not emerge since they may cause damage to the 
hardware, e.g., a crane carrying a part must not be lowered 
during horizontal movement to avoid collisions. These 
conditions need to hold for all cases of the behavior of a 
system, whether it is inherited from the old revision or newly 
introduced. For the parts of the aPS behavior covered by 
regression verification, the interlock conditions need not be 
re-verified – based on the assumption that they have been 
ensured at an earlier evolution stage. Thus, regression 
verification and invariant verification complement each other 
when performed in this sequence, which is why this order 
was chosen. In addition, the interlock conditions considered 
in this step are to be obeyed at all points in time and for any 
software revision, and can therefore be specified as global 
invariants that are not bound to a specific revision and can be 
reused. As these global invariant conditions are readily 
available after changing a system (from the last evolution 
step), this verification step requires low to no effort regarding 
the creation of a specification. 
Even though the interlock conditions themselves can be 
quite simple, the amount of cross connections between them 
can become confusing over time for the involved user(s). 
From our experience, many companies use simple tables to 
specify interlock conditions, as they give a clearly arranged 
overview and are easily comprehensible. As similar 
specifications are already commonly used in industry, we 
propose using a table to specify interlock invariants for this 
verification phase.  
Figure 2.  The invariant table can be used to specify invariant rules relating 
to actuator values 
As shown in Figure 2, an invariant table defines 
invariants for actuator values, e.g., “Actuator 1 may only be 
true if Sensor 1 is false or if Sensor 1 is true and Actuator 3 is 
false at the same time”. For this, an actuator variable is 
monitored    
actuators 
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Sensor 1 Actuator 3 
Actuator 1 True only if False o 
 
True or  True False 
Actuator 2 True only if True False 
 
True or False o 
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brought into relation with necessary conditions. The invariant 
table can be extended and adapted in every evolution step.  
For verification, invariant tables are interpreted as the 
conjunction of the global invariants described by the entries 
in the table. The first two lines in the table in Figure 2, e.g., 
are translated into the LTL property 
G (Actuator1 → ¬Sensor1 ∨ (Sensor1 ∧ ¬Actuator3)) . 
 
During model checking, the translation of the new version 
of the PLC software is checked against these properties. To 
reduce the search space, the negation of the condition may be 
used in regression verification as additional premise since 
those cases have already been considered. Therefore, we 
employ the IC3 approach [29], which computes an over-
approximation of the set of reachable states. It iteratively 
adds formulas supporting the interlock invariant. This 
computation is repeated as an iterative refinement of the 
approximation until there is no violation of the invariant. 
C. Phase 3: Delta Verification Targeted at Changed 
Behavior 
In the third and final verification phase – after verifying 
unchanged behavior (Section A) and global invariants 
(Section B) –, the newly introduced behavior itself is 
specified and verified. Here, the changed behavior (the delta) 
is analyzed in detail. Hence, a general critical interlock 
specification as in the last section is not sufficient to describe 
the newly introduced behavior; the specification is likely to 
become more complex than in Section B. However, formal 
delta specification and verification can be restricted to the 
parts of the behavior which are new. 
For the visualization and specification of complex signal 
sequences, timing diagrams have been established in factory 
automation industry [26]. Existing know-how in industry can 
be leveraged by using this specification method in this phase. 
The structure of a Boolean timing diagram consists of the 
considered actuators on the left side, and their correlated 
signal sequences on the right side, which are both embedded 
in a coordinate system with a timing axis and a Boolean 
value axis (see Figure 3). For verification, the timing 
sequence is interpreted as the sequence progression of 
changing Boolean values (i.e., the sequence of falling and 
rising edges). Using a model checker, the sequence of the 
actuator values is verified for following the diagram pattern: 
Edges which are vertically aligned in the diagram (connected 
by a dashed line) are to happen synchronously. Whether the 
duration of the signals in the diagram and the actual duration 
in the behavior are the same, is not checked in our approach. 
Only the chronological order of the signal values at the end 
of scan cycles is compared.  
Actuator 2
False
True
Actuator 1 False
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Figure 3.  Schematic of a Timing Diagram which is used as a specification 
for signal sequences in the presented approach 
Usually, behavioral changes affect only specific segments 
and specific variables of the input/output traces, e.g., steps in 
a process, which have been newly introduced or optimized. 
Outside the scope of this specification, the behavior is 
intended to be the same as in the previous revision – and thus 
its correctness is covered by regression verification. 
The two trigger points at which the specified behavior 
starts and ends respectively need to be specified in order to 
define the limits of the segments. Therefore, delta verification 
goes hand in glove with the regression verification phase. 
Together, the verification covers all complete input/output 
traces and the two synchronization points (start and end of 
the delta behavior) define which of the two verification 
techniques covers the part of the behavior. 
Ultimately, regression and delta verification can be 
combined into one model checking task which requires no 
more specification than the trigger points and the timing 
diagram. Hereby, the old revision is wrapped into a new 
reactive system: This system uses output values from the old 
revision during regression verification. Within the segments 
defined by the trigger points, values are defined by the 
specification of new behavior, e.g., as a timing diagram. 
D. Environment Models 
Formal verification considers all possible sequences of 
input signals (traces), and thus never misses observable 
machine behavior. Yet, it may also look at traces that cannot 
possibly occur in reality, which may cause false alarms. In 
order to reduce the number of such alarms and to make the 
verification more precise, models of the environment of the 
software (i.e., the physics of the plant, the sensors, interaction 
with work pieces, etc.) can be added to the verification 
conditions. Environment models are temporal specifications 
constraining the observable signal values, generally assumed 
to be non-deterministic. An engineer can use, for instance, 
schematic timing diagrams (such as in Section C), invariant 
tables (e.g., the actuator specifications in Section B), or more 
general mechanisms to define finite automata that describe 
the possible input signals. 
E.  Feedback to the application engineer 
Whenever the verification process succeeds, the 
application engineer gets a confirmation that the system 
under investigation is correct with respect to the specified 
property (there are no false negatives). The verification may 
fail either due to a wrong or insufficient specification or 
because of an actual mistake in the implementation. In either 
case, the model checker yields a counterexample trace 
contradicting the specification. 
Currently, this counterexample is presented to the 
engineer in its raw textual form. In future research, more 
descriptive notations, e.g., time sequence diagrams [26], will 
be investigated to further enhance the applicability of this 
approach in industry. Through displaying traces directly in 
the specification instead of a textual form, the application 
engineer is expected to gain a better understanding of the 
reason why the model checking process failed and will be 
provided a starting point for further investigation of the 
cause, e.g. a fault in the software or a specification which is 
too strict. Subsequently, the engineer can adjust either the 
  
specification or the software, and reiterate the verification 
process until a satisfactory outcome is reached. 
IV. CASE STUDY – PICK AND PLACE UNIT 
To demonstrate the feasibility and assess the performance 
properties of the presented approach, the approach has been 
applied to an evolution step of a laboratory plant. The plant, 
its software implementation and the examined evolution 
scenario are adapted from [30]. Additional software bugs 
were introduced a posteriori into the scenario to demonstrate 
the bug-finding capacities of the approach. The scenarios, 
specifications and verification conditions are described and 
discussed in the following.  
A. Base Scenario 
The laboratory sized automated production system “PPU” 
(Pick and Place Unit) consists of four components (cf. Figure 
4): A stack for storing work pieces (WP), a stamp for labeling 
white WPs, a conveyor for sorting WPs and a crane for pick 
and place operations between the modules. The function of 
the PPU in the base scenario is to pick and place black and 
white cylindrical WPs from a stack to a conveyor for further 
processing. All white WPs are labeled by a stamp unit before 
being placed on the conveyor; all black WPs are to be 
directly placed on the conveyor. The WPs placed on the 
conveyor are sorted onto different slides using pneumatic 
pushers. Using an optical sensor, the color of the WPs pushed 
out by the stack is determined (white or black). The crane can 
move up and down to pick and place WPs by means of a 
pneumatic suction unit and turn clockwise and 
counterclockwise to move between the modules. Two binary 
sensors detect the vertical position, one binary sensor detects 
a suctioned WP and three binary sensor detect whether the 
crane is at the respective station (stamp, stack and conveyor). 
The conveyor module in the software detects a placed WP 
using one binary sensor and signals the conveyor belt to 
move. 
Crane
StampStack
Sorting
Conveyor
  
Figure 4.  Laboratory aPS “PPU” used in the Case Study (see [30]) 
In the original revision of the plant, only one WP is 
processed at a time. To increase the throughput of the plant, 
the plant is subjected to an evolution step in which the PLC 
software is optimized while leaving the hardware unchanged. 
The new, optimized revision changed its behavior at one 
point: As soon as the crane places a white WP into the stamp 
module, the crane is to transport black WPs (if available) 
from the stack to the conveyor instead of waiting for the 
stamping process to finish. After placing the black WP on the 
conveyor, the stamped white WP is transported to the 
conveyor. This new feature only directly affects the software 
of the crane. A verification of the crane module alone is not 
possible because of dependencies between modules [30]. The 
new revision consists of four POUs, containing 117 Boolean 
and 11 integer variables, resulting in a state space of 
approximately 300 bits in the model checker. 
To verify that the new feature is implemented correctly 
while leaving the previously working behavior unaffected, 
the three-phase approach presented in Section III is used. To 
demonstrate the possibilities of the three verification steps, 
we have implanted exemplary errors into the code which 
were uncovered in the respective phase. Additional material 
for the case study is assembled on a companion website [31]. 
B. Phase 1: Verifying supposedly unchanged behavior 
Conditional regression verification is used in this first 
phase to prove that specified parts of the behavior are 
preserved despite the optimization of the software. The 
specification of the condition under which equivalence is 
expected, is provided in structured natural language. In this 
case, if a sequence of exclusively white WPs or exclusively 
black WPs is placed into the machine, the newly introduced 
feature is not used and the behavior should therefore be 
unaffected. Changes to this behavior are not intended and are 
to be uncovered. In structured language, the specification 
confining the regression verification to this behavior reads as 
follows: 
“If OpticalSensor is always true or OpticalSensor is always 
false, then both revisions behave identically.” 
The sensor “OpticalSensor” detects the brightness of the 
WPs at the stack position. If it is true, the WP is white, 
otherwise it is black. The value of “OpticalSensor” is fixed to 
be constant (either true or false) to encode the condition of 
regression verification, all remaining input signals are 
modelled as non-deterministic choices. The implanted error 
was found in the implementation by a divergence in the 
signals for the crane movement after 22 PLC scan cycles, 
beginning with a cold start of the hardware. This difference 
occurs due to an incorrect transition guard in the new SFC 
revision. For this and the following proofs, we use NUXMV 
[32] as the model checker together with the invariant 
generation engine IC3. The model checker returns a trace of 
the counter example in 26 seconds and needs 22 minutes to 
prove equivalence with a correct version of the new revision.1 
C. Phase 2: Ensuring Invariants 
To avoid dangerously critical situations, invariant tables 
can be used to specify restrictions on actuator values w.r.t. 
sensor value combinations. In this scenario, it is assumed that 
the developers defined constraints for the crane to avoid 
collisions at the conveyor: The crane should not move if it 
carries a WP and there is a WP at the conveyor, as this would 
result in a collision. Table I represents these invariants. The 
sensor “WP suctioned” indicates a vacuum buildup in the 
 
1 We measured all runtimes in this paper on an Intel Core i7 860 2.8 
GHz. The given runtimes are the rounded values of the median of 5 
samples. 
  
suction cup of the handling device of the crane, which occurs 
if a work piece is picked up. Thus, “WP suctioned = True” 
indicates that the crane is transporting a work piece in which 
case it is only allowed to move (Crane_CW or Crane_CCW 
is true) if there is no work piece on the conveyor (Conveyor 
occupied is false). If the crane does not carry any payload 
(WP suctioned is false), it is allowed to turn, even if the 
conveyor is occupied as there is no danger of collision. 
TABLE 1: INVARIANT TABLE FOR VERIFYING “CRANE NOT MOVING WHILE 
WP TRANSPORTATION AND ANOTHER WP ON CONVEYOR”  
Actuator 
  
WP suctioned Conveyor occupied 
Crane_CW True only if False o 
 
True or  True False 
Crane_CCW True only if True False 
 
True or False o 
“CW”: Clockwise, “CCW”: Counterclockwise, “o”: omitted 
To reduce the possible sensor values in the verification 
process, a simple environment model was created and used. 
This environment model describes the possible “Conveyor 
occupied” sensor values dependent on previous actuator and 
signal occurrences. In this scenario, the environment model is 
a simple state machine with two states which ensures that the 
Conveyor can only become occupied if the crane has released 
a WP at the conveyor.  
The proof performed by the model checker checks that 
the interlock properties are global invariants throughout all 
PLC scan cycles. It took 5 seconds to prove that the old 
revision satisfies the invariant, and 18 seconds to find a 
counter example for the implanted fault in the new revision. 
The counterexample trace can be used as a support to start 
investigating the cause of the regression within the source 
code. 
D. Phase 3: Verifying changed behavior 
To specifically verify the changed behavior in this case 
study, the signal sequence of the new feature was modeled by 
means of a timing diagram. The new feature is the changed 
movement of the crane while a white WP is being labeled at 
the stamp and a black WP is available at the stack and 
subsequently placed on the conveyor. Figure 5 depicts a part 
of the diagram, which was used to derive the sequence of 
signals relevant for describing the newly introduced behavior. 
The behavioral description of the new feature is partial in the 
sense that it does not make statements about the course of 
signals before and after the considered segment, nor does it 
state anything about sensors/actuators not explicitly 
mentioned in the model. These excluded parts of the behavior 
are required to behave as in the previous revision of the 
program, since a diversion would be unintended. 
The actuator variable “CraneLower” is used for vertical 
movement of the crane (“true” lowers the crane, “false” 
invokes an upward motion), whereas the actuators 
“Crane_CW” and “Crane_CCW” invoke the clockwise and 
counterclockwise rotation of the crane. The depicted 
sequence in Figure 5 shows the crane being moved upwards 
(“CraneLower” is set to false). The crane is subsequently 
turned clockwise (Figure 5, Position 1) until it reaches the 
desired position (Figure 5, Position 2), after which it is 
lowered (Figure 5, Position 3) to pick up a WP and moves 
back up (Figure 5, Position 4). The specified segment of the 
sequence continues, describing the new feature in detail. 
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Figure 5.  Timing-diagram of new behavior in the evolution process 
Besides the timing diagram, the specification includes 
local conditions (trigger points) which determine the start and 
the end of the behavioral segment described in the timing 
diagram. Through this, every behavior was split into 
unchanged segments (behavior before and after the specified 
sequence which are subject to regression verification) and 
segments corresponding to the new features (which are 
subject to delta verification w.r.t. the timing diagram). Thus, 
the entire behavior is covered by the combination of the two 
verification techniques. 
Our verification toolchain required 20 seconds to prove 
that all segments limited by the trigger points are equal to the 
behavior specified in the timing diagram. The regression 
verification for the unchanged behavior segments took 
29 minutes. 
E. Discussion of Results 
The presented approach propagates a tight integration of 
formal verification into the development process during 
software evolution. The threefold verification supports the 
engineer in focusing on the changed behavior. The first step 
is to differentiate what behavior is new and what is (supposed 
to be) unchanged. The regression verification supports the 
engineer and uncovers indirect or unintended changes in the 
software and misconceptions in the engineer’s understanding 
of the technical process within the aPS early on. The second 
verification step serves as a sanity check which does not 
require new specifications but is performed quickly as 
available specifications are used and only the changed part of 
the system needs to be covered. The third part is closer to 
traditional specification and verification – but profits from 
the evolution scenario. Through the reference to the old 
revision, the specification becomes more comprehensible and 
concise, and allows the verification to run considerably more 
efficiently. 
As preliminary results from this study, it was found that 
the required runtimes depend on multiple factors: the 
complexity of the trigger points within the delta specification, 
the similarity of the software revisions and the quality of the 
refinement process within the IC3 technique. In case of 
simple trigger points, very similar software revisions and a 
good formula choice for refinement in IC3, efficient runtimes 
can be expected.  
To gain further knowledge about the scalability of the 
approach, additional studies are needed and are focus of 
future work. 
  
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, a verification-supported evolution approach 
to assist software application engineers in industrial Factory 
Automation was presented. By combining regression 
verification techniques with invariant verification and 
focused verification of changed behavior, the complexity of 
the verification problem can be reduced and specification 
efforts are minimized for evolution scenarios. In addition, 
two intuitive and well-established specification notations are 
proposed for use in the verification process. Thus, the main 
problems currently hindering adoption of formal verification 
in factory automation are approached. In a case study 
applying the approach to a laboratory plant in an exemplary 
evolution scenario, the feasibility is shown and the 
performance was measured to allow a performance 
assessment. 
In future research, further convergence with industrial 
requirements is aimed at by introducing a comprehensive 
visualization of counter examples which are produced by the 
model checker in case the verification process fails. 
Moreover, the approach is to be extended by further 
commonly used notations and a study within the industry to 
fully evaluate the applicability within the domain of factory 
automation. For this, an industrial case study will be 
conducted including several companies in the domain of food 
and pharmaceutical packaging. Investigations towards better 
scalability of our approach through applications within 
further case studies are another focus of future work. 
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